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1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA APR 1 5 2010 2 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI JEANNE HICKS, Clerk

Chamberlain 3 4 THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 5 Plaintiff, 6 No. CR 2008-1339 vs. 7 STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER, 8 Defendant. 9 10 11 **BEFORE:** THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 12 DIVISION SIX YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA 13 14 PRESCOTT, ARIZONA TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2010 15 11:11 A.M. A.M. SESSION ONLY 16 17 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 18 PRETRIAL MOTIONS 19 20 21 22 23 24 ROXANNE E. TARN, CR

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Certified Court Reporter Certificate No. 50808

APRIL 13, 2010 11:11 A.M.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE: MR. JOE BUTNER AND MR. JEFF PAPOURE.

FOR THE DEFENDANT: MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY HAMMOND AND MS. ANNE CHAPMAN.

THE COURT: This is State versus Steven

Carroll DeMocker. It is CR 2008-1339. The defendant is

present in custody with Mr. Sears, Mr. Hammond, Ms. Chapman,

here for the defense team. Mr. Butner is here for the

prosecution.

I am open to hearing from you what issues you may have. Obviously, this afternoon we have Suzanne Smith appearing at 1:15, and I think my staff has provided each of you with some other information on jurors. On April 8th, I already had excused potential jurors Cartilage, Marshal, Bower, Rouche. I think we received, after that hearing concluded, some additional information from a Sharon Johnson, and I noted that she was on your list of potential jurors to be excused, in any event, from the defense team.

I don't know the State's position with regard to excusing Miss Johnson after the information that I think my staff provided to you.

MR. BUTNER: I am not prepared on that, Judge.

I will be this afternoon.

THE COURT: Okay. We can discuss it this afternoon.

Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Judge, we have a number of things that we would like to take up. We are prepared to argue our motion to preclude certain matters disclosed in State's supplemental disclosures 50 through 54. That's been fully briefed now. The reply was filed yesterday. Ms. Chapman would be prepared now to speak to that.

We have a number of other matters related to conditions for Mr. DeMocker -- some matters related to his grooming and appearance in court.

We also have a number of questions -- and we don't know whether the State shares any of these questions or not -- as follow-ups to your ruling at the end of last week on our various motions for sanctions. There are some aspects of that that, even after looking at the transcript that we received from that proceeding, we are not entirely sure about going forward. We want to know if you would provide us with a bit more clarity on portions of the ruling there.

And other than that, we are prepared to start the motions. We're also prepared, obviously, this

afternoon to discuss matters regarding jury selection, and we have been for some time.

THE COURT: Before I commence on that,

Mr. Butner, Chris Dupont, the representative for Katie

DeMocker, sent us and showed a copy to you and to Mr. Sears

and Mr. Hammond and Ms. Chapman -- sent an e-mail referring

to the subpoena of Katie DeMocker indicating that he would

accept service of a subpoena on behalf of Katie DeMocker. I

presume you have looked at that e-mail.

MR. BUTNER: I have, Judge. He also indicated -- I follow-up with a phone call directly to Mr. Dupont. He also indicated that he would accept service for Charlotte DeMocker, and we were going to try and work with them to, you know, make this a relatively convenient kind of a thing, if at all possible.

THE COURT: Okay. So you are going to provide the actual time and notify him about what other travel funds may be available to his client -- or clients, plural?

MR. BUTNER: Right. Well, I don't think, you know, there's any travel funds necessary for Charlotte, but Katie -- we did indicate that we would be paying for her to come over. If I understood him correctly, he indicated he didn't think she would be going back, it would just be one way, and he thought that she would be driving. So I am going to finalize that sort of situation with the people that

1 handle those kinds of things in our office. 2 THE COURT: Do you agree with the observations 3 on his e-mail that that should make the L.A. proceedings 4 issue moot? 5 MR. BUTNER: I do. 6 THE COURT: Good. Then I won't worry about it 7 anymore. 8 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Unless some further hiccups come 10 into play. 11 Is there any update on Sorenson? 12 MR. BUTNER: I haven't gotten anything from 13 Sorenson yet, Judge. I was going to try to get ahold of them 14 today. 15 THE COURT: All right. Some of the issues 16 raised by the motion concerning the State's 50th through 54th 17 disclosure, that motion filed March 30th with a response by 18 the State and a reply by the defense, some of that may 19 overlap with some of the other issues that you are talking 20 about with regard to clarity or lack of clarity in my ruling. 21 So why don't we go ahead with that one, and if there is some 22 other issues that you think I need to touch on in connection 23 with that, I will. 24 Ms. Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

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the motion by talking about the supplemental report, which the State provided in its response from Sergeant Winslow. He does two things in that supplemental report.

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One is he goes back and attempts to reconstruct by track measurements that were left 17 months earlier behind the property of Ms. Kennedy. We have several objections to his ability to do that, the primary one being that there is just no reliable way for him to reconstruct what happened 17 months earlier, based on his own memory.

And in addition to that, the State had an obligation and a duty to perform those measurements at the time in July, when the tracks were actually there and visible to Sergeant Winslow or anyone else who could have performed those measurements and not disclose them to us as late as they have. They disclosed this information on March 17 to the defense. It hadn't been disclosed earlier. Those measurements were not performed earlier, as far as we know. And frankly, we don't think they are at all reliable.

The other thing that he does, Your Honor, is he purports to perform shoeprint comparisons. And in the second piece of his report, what he does is -- in his interview, he told Mr. Sears that he had no recollection of any shoeprints being near the bike track. And what the State's response says is essentially that Mr. Winslow was trying to refresh his recollection by looking at photographs

to determine whether or not there were shoeprints near the bike tracks. And while it may be appropriate for him to refresh his recollection to do that, what he goes on to do is to compare photographs of shoeprints with other photographs of shoeprints, or perhaps his memory is unclear from the report, but he certainly does photograph-to-photograph comparison.

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He then attempts to draw conclusions about whether photographs of certain shoeprints match other photographs of other shoeprints, which direction those shoeprints are headed, how many shoeprints are in each photograph, whether the shoeprints within each photograph were similar, and whether the shoeprints between photographs are similar. He has not been disclosed as a shoeprint comparison expert. Those are not based on his personal observations of the scene. He couldn't remember observing any shoeprints that were near those bike tracks at the interview. And those opinions were disclosed to us also on March 17, after his defense interview. They are not permitted under 701. It's not based on his personal observation. They are late disclosed, and he is not an expert who's qualified to make those opinions.

So that is the first piece of this motion.

THE COURT: Let's take it individually.

Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Sergeant Winslow did go back to the scene. Based on his own memory, he went back and with photographs he attempted to measure where those footprints were that he observed when he was out there. And then using those photographs, he also refreshed his recollection to the fact that were shoeprints alongside the bicycle tracks.

This is permissible to do. People frequently refresh their recollection with photographs and other items of evidence like that. He was under no duty to stop with his investigation simply because he had a defense interview.

So I think it is permissible, what he did. He is certainly not going to testify as an expert, but you can't expect somebody to get on the stand and say something that simply isn't true because they forgot at the time of their defense interview.

All he was doing was going back and refreshing his recollection, to make sure that his recollection was accurate, and when it wasn't, he then corrected his recollection and issued a report in that regard. He's not going to be offered as an expert on shoeprint comparison. And if you'll note -- I guess you don't have a copy of the report -- but the report indicates that he didn't find any difference between the shoeprints and

those that were present at the scene.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, you actually do have a copy of the report. It was provided to you as Exhibit A to the State's response.

And what he says is that he compares multiple tracks and he describes them as being similar, he describes them as having little difference, he describes them, again, as being similar, and appear to be made by the same and similar shoe. So he is making shoeprint comparison. That is not a refreshing of his recollection.

What Mr. Butner is offering him to testify to is that he can look at a photograph and determine that there were shoeprints there that he didn't remember were there, I think that is fine. But if he's going to compare those shoeprints to other shoeprints in other photographs or two shoeprints within the same photograph, that is not a matter of refreshing his recollection, that's not a matter that he is qualified to testify about, and that is precisely what he attempts to do at Bates Page 19763, which is the second page of the Exhibit A of the State's response. That is with respect to the shoeprint comparison that he is performing in this report that's disclosed to us on March 17.

And Your Honor, I don't think there is any dispute that with respect to the measurements -- he

performed them 17 months later -- whether or not he had photographs that he took 17 months earlier of the track, he doesn't know where that began, where it ended, and to perform measurements and come in and testify about what those measurements were 17 months later, there is no way for that to be reliable at all, and the State had an obligation to perform that in July of 2008, not in February of 2010, two months before trial in this matter. THE COURT: During his first interview, did he give estimations of where the shoeprints were, the bike

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prints were -- tire prints were?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, my memory is --Mr. Sears was at the interview -- but my memory is that he said he did not have a clear recollection of where they were.

THE COURT: So he didn't give approximately such and such a distance?

MS. CHAPMAN: I don't believe he did. I think he said he could not remember.

THE COURT: Whereas now in the report he gives some distance that's based on taking a measurement from where he estimates the prints were but not -- obviously, they are not still there at the time of the conducted measurements.

MS. CHAPMAN: He takes approximately 20 measurements and measures them by feet. He's very precise, and he's creating a whole track of measurements, based on his memory of where these bike tracks were 17 months earlier, in this new report.

THE COURT: Do you think that at all goes to weight rather than admissibility and you can impeach the snot out of them for what --

MS. CHAPMAN: Well, I think we could do that, Your Honor. But I think the fact that they waited 17 months to do this and didn't disclose it to us until March, after the defense interview, is enough to preclude it on that basis.

These measurements should have been performed in July of '08. That was their obligation, and that's when they should have done it. They didn't do it then.

So we haven't had an opportunity to look at this until now. Our experts haven't had an opportunity to go out there and examine it. And we have three weeks to go.

So it could be an impeachment matter, but it should be a preclusion matter based on their due diligence and their failure to exercise it.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: Well, Judge, my recollection of Sergeant Winslow's testimony was that he was not sure of the exact location of the footprints, and he stated that in his interview. But I think he did give an estimate as to when

they began. And beyond that, you know, I can't tell you with any precision.

THE COURT: Then you are going to present him as saying, though, he took a ruler out there and it's now such-and-such feet or --

MR. BUTNER: Well, certainly any testimony he would give would be based on foundation that was laid beforehand, so any measurements that he testifies about are going to be measurements that he has to admit on the witness stand were taken much later than the time of the photographs were taken. I think it does go to the weight, Judge, rather than the admissibility.

THE COURT: And the testimony with regard to shoeprints, he is not going to say identity, he is not even going to say similar, he is not going to say that he remembered what the pattern was in the shoeprints in the manner in which a lay witness would, under Rule 701 --

MR. BUTNER: If he is asked "Did you look at the shoeprints at some point to compare them with what was much later discovered, obviously -- the La Sportiva shoe,"

Judge, he is in a position to say "I couldn't find any difference between them."

He is not the witness that is going to be presenting that kind of testimony.

THE COURT: I am going to preclude this

testimony. I think to talk about it at all, rather than in descriptive terms of here is what I observed in terms of the detail of what I saw in the sand or clay or whatever it was -- I mean, he could testify to that, apparently, when he was interviewed. He didn't even testify to that. Rather, he had to, quote, "refresh his recollection," close quote, using photographs.

So the question is, is his recollection really refreshed, or is he simply testifying as to what he sees now in the photograph. And I think the jury is capable of making conclusions about those things. They don't need any testimony of what his recollection was, unless he can honestly swear that this recollection had a certain pattern of shoe to it. So I --

MR. BUTNER: Judge, what he provided in his interview was that it looked to be a hiking type of boot, is what he stated in his interview.

THE COURT: I think he can say that.

MR. BUTNER: Okay.

anything about what the pattern was unless he had a recollection of that without simply relying on the photographs to, quote, "remember," close quote. And certainly he is not the expert to testify as to whether that shoe may -- we have another issue with regard to that, I

know, but I don't think Sergeant Winslow can testify under Rule 702 as an expert.

I think the measurements go to weight, not admissibility. And, frankly, the precision of his measurements is totally in question. You are going to have to lay a foundation for how he made any kind of determination as to that, and I may sustain a foundation objection, but not on a disclosure basis.

Next item.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, the next --

THE COURT: It's similar?

MS. CHAPMAN: It is. It is. It's with respect to Mr. Mascher -- Commander Mascher. Your Honor, this is, I think, another example of the State trying to provide expert testimony by calling it personal observation.

commander Mascher performed an examination of a sample shoe that the defense has never been provided with. He then compared that sample shoe to shoeprints at the scene. He then opines about whether the sample shoe matches shoeprints found at the scene.

He then performs another examination by purporting to trace the sole of the sample shoe and compare that to prints at the scene. He then compares those soles. He then purports to determine a size of the print at the scene, which I believe the State's late-disclosed expert on

shoeprint examination said was impossible.

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These are not personal observations under Rule 701. These are scientific examinations and experiment. The State has late disclosed another expert on these issues. Commander Mascher is not a shoeprint expert. The State has repeatedly avowed that to this Court and has repeatedly avowed that it's not going to be offering Commander Mascher as an expert on these issues.

I mean, to a certain extent, anytime an expert performs an examination and then testifies about that examination, I guess that could be described as his personal observation about the examination, but that is no more or less than what this is. And Commander Mascher doesn't have the training or qualifications to do this kind of examination or testing that he's purporting to perform in this report.

Furthermore, this report was disclosed to us, I believe, also on March 17. There has been no disclosure about Commander Mascher's training to perform these kinds of comparison or examinations.

And the defense -- we have never been provided with a sample shoe. We have no ability to acquire a sample shoe like this. These shoes are not for sale. We can't perform an examination similar to the one Commander Mascher performed. We can't evaluate his comparison because we have no access to the thing he used to perform his

examination that he is not qualified to perform.

So we would ask you to exclude it on all of these bases.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, this is another sort of a situation where Commander Mascher compared the footprints that he observed at the scene with the recently discovered La Sportiva shoe to see if he noted any differences based upon his personal observations when he was out at the scene. He is not being offered as an expert in that regard.

But in the event he were to be asked some sort of a question like, well, "Did you find any difference between the La Sportiva shoes and the shoeprints that you observed at the scene when you were tracking out there," he could answer, "Well, based on my comparison, I didn't find any such differences."

He will not be offered as a witness on that particular fact. He will be offered as witness only on the tracking.

THE COURT: So what direction the shoes were going, he can tell the heel from the toe and that --

MR. BUTNER: He can tell that kind of information, Judge, and that is significant for his testimony, in terms of the direction the person is headed.

THE COURT: But he would say something beyond

what Winslow would say in terms of it looked like a hiking 1 2 boot or shoe. 3 That is basically what he would MR. BUTNER: 4 say, that it looked like a hiking shoe or boot, just like 5 Detective Winslow. And he did not have any idea what type it 6 was when he was out there tracking, and he wouldn't know 7 anything until, of course, we discovered the La Sportiva shoe 8 sole. 9 THE COURT: Well, did he have a notation in 10 his reports and the like of what the pattern was on the 11 purported hiking shoe? 12 MR. BUTNER: You mean the specificity of the 13 pattern, these kind of marks and that kind of thing? 14 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 15 MR. BUTNER: I am sure that something was not 16 done like that in his report. 17 THE COURT: But in terms of following -- you 18 represented earlier that he was a tracking expert, not a 19 shoeprint expert --20 MR. BUTNER: That's correct, Judge. 21 THE COURT: -- and so following a set of 22 tracks from Point A to Point B to Point C to Point D, he has 23 developed some skills and expertise with regard to that. 24 MR. BUTNER: That's correct.

THE COURT: And that was the area, I think,

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that you previously said he was going to do.

MR. BUTNER: That's correct.

THE COURT: I think that that's -- he's had sufficient training to be able to do that. I don't think that he is a shoeprint expert. I don't think that he can testify as to a pattern of what he saw or similarity to a La Sportiva shoe that was found. I think that is more on foundational grounds and lack of disclosure.

With regard to his qualifications for being a shoeprint identification expert, following tracks from Point A to Point B and describing in terms -- general or precise, depending on whether he did any measurements -- about the direction they went, when they changed and that sort of thing, to the extent he can do that, I think is admissible.

If he had some degree of information as far as what his observations were about the pattern that was made by the shoes, that he made a note of at the time, that is fine. But if he is simply relying on photographs and saying that "The photographs look to me, as a tracker, like the same pattern as are on the bottom of the La Sportiva shoe," I don't think there is foundation for him to do that. I don't think that he is an expert to be capable of doing that, and I would preclude that testimony -- or even to say it is similar, because I think that is getting into an

expertise that he doesn't have and admittedly, at some prior hearing, it was indicated that he didn't have.

Next issue.

with respect to the process computer forences and examination. And Your Honor, we did discuss this briefly, because it was briefed initially, based on the partial disclosure that the State has made in the February 5th filing. Since that time, Your Honor, we've received, I think, approximately 12 additional CDs from the State.

I have provided Your Honor with the reports -- at least partial reports that identify the date that the report was requested so that Your Honor can see -- because you noted, on April 8th, that these examinations take time, and that part of the due diligence with respect to the late disclosure of what is now approximately 70,000 pages of reports, an e-mail that was based on the time it takes to conduct these examinations, and you will see from those attachments that these examinations were requested in February and March. Those examinations and those requests that were done in February and March have resulted in a production to us of approximately 70,000 pages of e-mails and reports that have been disclosed. Seven of those CDs were provided in the -- on March 2nd and March 17th, and five

additional were disclosed on April 1st.

CDS

TO DOC pages

prails + reps

We have had serious issues with the process of the D.P.S. examination disclosure. As you will recall, the power source wasn't removed from one of these items. That created destruction of some of these items. The examination has been performed by largely by non-qualified non-expert Detective Page.

And we have yet to receive the EnCase encase case files, which our expert requires in order to conduct a files thorough examination of the examination and evaluation done by D.P.S. We have been asking for this for months. We talked about it when Randy Arthur was on the stand. We filed motions about it to detail for the State and for Your Honor what the EnCase case file is, what it means, how critical it is to the examination, both in terms of what D.P.S. does and in terms of our expert's ability to examine it.

We are, frankly, just not a position to review what has now been disclosed to us at this late date. It is also unclear from the reports and disclosure whether these are now complete. The State has had these items since July of '08, with the exception of the report that's detailed at -- a Report 4, which they had since January.

And you will note that they didn't begin the examination of those items until seven months later, and that came from Detective Arthur's testimony. And Your Honor, we are frankly just not in a position to be prepared to

review what was disclosed at this late date. The State has offered no excuse.

I believe Mr. Butner said he doesn't know where we're getting the dates of the February and March request, but now you have them, he has them. We know when the requests were made, we know when they were disclosed, and we think they should be precluded on that basis.

THE COURT: And so effectively, what does that mean? Obviously, you've had some disclosure and some knowledge of certain items from the computer with regard to what Detective Page testified about at the Simpson hearing and the Chronis hearing.

MS. CHAPMAN: Right. Well, I have no way to know what -- I mean, I know what Detective Page and what the State disclosed earlier with respect to those e-mails that were disclosed at the Chronis hearing. I have no way to know whether those are duplicated. I assume that there is some duplicated in the 68-, 70,000 pages that we got in the last three or four weeks, but I frankly haven't performed that evaluation. None of these disclosures are Bates stamped. They are just disclosed to us on a CD. So I just don't know the answer to that question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Well, Judge, first of all, we've

only heard testimony from one expert, so to speak, concerning the EnCase case file, and Detective Arthur said he doesn't understand what they are talking about in that regard, and they don't have such things, and that is not the way it is done. I am not in any position to really argue that particular fact, but the only evidence that is before the Court concerning that is from the testimony of Randy Arthur.

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In regard to the dates -- and I looked at the reports with those dates in there -- in regard to the dates of requested examination, that's the latest date of requested examination that was noted in the report. requested examinations were ongoing from back in -- when I first got involved in this case, and I can't speak to sooner than that, but I certainly was all over the people at the D.P.S. lab and including Detective Page, saying we've got to get these examinations done on these computers. So I don't know exactly how they came up with the date, other than we had frequent meetings with them saying you need to get the computer examination and analysis completed. At points in time we were meeting on a weekly basis with them telephonically, inquiring as to what kind of progress they had made.

In regard to -- one of the reports by the expert that checked the computer to see how it worked, so to speak, and what caused it to go off and on, that kind of

thing, that was requested by me probably in January, and I wanted them to video the entire process of that computer turning itself on and then turning itself off as the power died in order to discover, if you will, what the problem was in terms of the alleged destruction of files in

Mr. DeMocker's laptop computer. That report was done in order to ascertain exactly what that process was, Judge, and it had been requested previously. It was insistently requested the last time to get it accomplished, and apparently that is the date that they finally took note of it. So that is how that date got into the report.

Detective Page, you heard his testimony on previous occasions as to what kind of analysis he had been doing, including getting the e-mails printed out. He produced the e-mails for the Chronis hearing, which is prior to the time of the argument that it was late disclosed. He also produced the information concerning Mr. DeMocker's word searches in his computers.

THE COURT: So is that all you are intending to get in, now, out of all of the 70,000 pages that allegedly has now been disclosed and CDs that are not Bates stamped?

MR. BUTNER: It appears, though, Judge, that the only evidence that I really deem relevant and now admissible is, first of all, the evidence about the word searches at the beginning in how to make a suicide look like

a homicide -- or rather how to make a homicide look like a suicide or an accident. That testimony.

And then the e-mails that were presented at the Chronis hearing and any prior e-mails that were presented at hearings, if I am overlooking any, and I don't think I am. But I am sure about the ones that were presented in the Chronis hearing. Those e-mails.

E-mails that were early disclosed in the case at the outset. And then the Court has already precluded the UBS e-mails. So I think that that's basically it, Judge.

And especially the analysis, the explanation of how the computer reacts when the power supply has not been removed and it is still in storage and it turns itself on and turns itself off, allegedly resulting in file destruction.

THE COURT: So despite the fact that there is 60,000 or 70,000, whatever the number actually is of pages of information from the computer, your intention is not to go outside of what essentially has already been used in Simpson and Chronis hearings --

MR. BUTNER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and the explanation about the videotaping about the way in which the computer works.

MR. BUTNER: Right. We would like to revisit the issue, at some point, of the Jennifer Rydzewski e-mail,

though, Judge, because of the fact that that disclosure took place practically at the beginning of this case with County Attorney's Office.

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THE COURT: Well, if you want to revisit that, tell me what the reason is that that might be admissible.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, it is in extremely close proximity in time to the time of the homicide, and it evidences the defendant's state of mind, when he says, basically, burn it and bury it, and it's a joint account that he shared with Carol Kennedy. And I think that that's very appropriate information. That was disclosed to the defense at the outset of this case, and it's something that I think the jury is entitled to see. It is probative of the defendant's state of mind on the date that the homicide occurred.

THE COURT: It's too remote. I don't find it relevant. I will stay with the decision I already made with regard to that.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I just want to correct the record with respect to one thing. You do have evidence in the record about the EnCase case file, because we filed it in the motion that we filed on February 25th from the EnCase case manual that identified it was critical piece and part of the evaluation for EnCase. Mr. Arthur, apparently, is the head of the D.P.S. computer forensics lab.

So the fact that he didn't have the information is disturbing, but it is not the only word that Your Honor has in the record about the existence of the file and its importance to this kind of forensic examination.

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If the Court is going to limit and if the State is going to be limited to the e-mails that were previously presented at the Chronis hearing and the Simpson hearing and to the word searches that have been previously disclosed at those hearings and to this analysis about how the computer reacts when the power source is not removed and it brings itself back on -- if they are limited to those things and they can identify those e-mails or those e-mails are identified, specifically with respect to what's already been admitted, then I think we are fine. But I think that needs to be very carefully defined, because the disclosure, as it's been presented, has never been Bates numbered to us, it's just put on a CD, and so we don't have any way to keep track of them, unless the State does it, or unless it's identified by previous evidence item number. And so I just want to be very clear if we are going to limit it that way, that we do it in a way that makes the record eminently clear, so that there is not a question later on.

THE COURT: I don't regard those as late disclosed, even with the regard to the evaluation, trying to figure out a reason why the computer may or may not have

turned itself on. I think I will allow that use.

I will allow the use of the searches for those -- the information that was derived and testified to at the prior hearings, because I don't think that is late disclosed either. And I will take the State at its word that Mr. Butner is not seeking to use the other 60,000 or better pages of information with regard to that.

But I think both sides have been aware, and to the extent that there can be some explanation by better trained experts than Detective Page with regard to tracing those particular items to try to make a determination about when they were created or took place, I think is relevant information, it is probative information, and not unfairly prejudicial, given that it was known to the defense previously.

I think the additional information to dump -- we are not talking about a 34-day trial, we're probably talking about a year or two trial, if they were trying to get in 70,000 pages' worth of documents. And so I guess part of my problem with the whole issue of the numbers of pages dumped is what the defense is talking about with regard to lacking enough time to do it when the information, it seems to me, was available to the State's representatives and capable of disclosing if it had any relevancy much earlier. And the failure to segregate the relevant

information from the clearly irrelevant information just to dump it, I don't think is a fair way of approaching -- or what the rules of procedure for criminal cases intends.

So, analyzing it in terms of sanctions, I think a preclusion order is appropriate for those items that do not pertain to what was previously presented by the State, but I don't find a vast volume of that probative based on what Mr. Butner has told me. I find probative those items that pertain to alleged searches for information as previously disclosed and testified to in the prior hearings.

So I guess I recognize what you are saying. I would ask the State to clarify with more precision which precise Bates numbers they intend to use actually from those general topic areas of searching for Web sites containing that information. I think some of the testimony and maybe some of the exhibits that we have seen earlier presented to the Court may show identity of those documents, but I share the defense's concern of a need for greater precision about -- well, searches for what words, to what extent those can be identified and the documentation that has been presented out of the vast numbers of documents that are potential for use.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, could we ask that that be done by a certain date just so that we can process that on our end, as well?

THE COURT: Do you have a proposal?

MR. BUTNER: Yes, Judge. We will have that done by the time we submit our exhibits for marking.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CHAPMAN: Which is Monday.

THE COURT: And that is Monday. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the speed that you are committing to. And so ordered by Monday, April the 19th.

MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you. Your Honor, I know that your April 8th order addressed some of the La Sportiva information, so I would like to narrow it down for one particular issue, and that really is this issue of the sample shoe.

This La Sportiva shoe is no longer in production, so no person can go out and buy it or order it or find it. The State apparently did have a sample shoe provided to it. I am not really sure how that happened. No sample shoe has been provided to the defense. The State, then, apparently provided that sample shoe to Commander Mascher. Also, apparently, provided that sample shoe to a Stutchman Forensics, and that's the subject of a motion that was filed this morning, Your Honor, but also provided it to Mr. Gilkerson. And apparently, these photos of the sample shoes were also provided to those same experts. They were superimposed on some other photos of shoeprints that was the

subject of the motion that was filed today.

MS. CHAPMAN: I think these are photos of some -- we guess they are sample shoes. I don't have any reports, so I don't know who took the photos or where they come from or anything really about the sample shoe, other than it appears to be a shoe that's no longer in production that was provided to experts and to Commander Mascher, but wasn't provided to us.

With three weeks to go, Your Honor, we're not in a position -- even if it was provided to us, which it hasn't been -- to examine or otherwise evaluate either the sample shoe or the report that Mr. Gilkerson has now prepared as a result of this sample shoe or these photographs. We don't have the ability to go get the sample shoe. We don't have the ability to perform independent analysis or examination or comparisons that have been done with the sample shoe. We haven't been provided with any 15.6 notice that these sample shoes are going to be provided or that there's going to be any other information with respect to the sample shoe.

So what we are asking at this point, Your Honor, is that any evidence, the photographs, or any reports that relate to the sample shoes, any examination or evaluation that have anything to do with these sample shoes

or these photographs be precluded, based on the fact that we 1 2 don't have them, we don't have time, if they were provided to 3 us now, to do the examination or evaluation on them, they 4 haven't been provided to us, and we have no way to get them. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Butner, tell me about the 6 shoes. 7 Well, Judge, Detective McDormett MR. BUTNER: 8 got the sample shoe from La Sportiva. 9 THE COURT: When? 10 MR. BUTNER: Not very long ago, and I can't 11 tell you exactly when that is, Judge, but not very long ago. 12 THE COURT: Did he do a report that reflects 13 that? 14 MR. BUTNER: I believe so, but I can't give 15 you the number of it at this point in time. Yes, it was 16 reflected in a report. 17 And that is where those shoes were 18 obtained from, and the defense has the same opportunity to 19 get sample shoes from La Sportiva that the State does. 20 THE COURT: Are you intending to introduce the 21 sample La Sportiva shoe? 22 MR. BUTNER: We were intending to introduce 23 the sample La Sportiva shoe, yes. 24 Don't they have a right to examine THE COURT: 25 the evidence that purportedly you will be using?

1 MR. BUTNER: Certainly they do. Certainly 2 they do, and they can examine it. 3 Don't they have a right to do THE COURT: 4 their own testing with --5 MR. BUTNER: If they ask to do that, I think 6 they probably do. Sure, they can do some testing on it. 7 I'm not sure that we have the shoe with 8 us right now. It may be with the FBI. I think it's there, 9 is at the FBI, but we could, of course, get it back from them 10 and plan on doing so. THE COURT: When you say "FBI," does that mean 11 12 Quantico? 13 MR. BUTNER: Yes. THE COURT: That is where you believe it is 14 15 now? 16 MR. BUTNER: Right. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Chapman. MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, it is not just the 18 19 introduction of these shoes and these photographs, but these 20 shoes and these photographs -- and I guess part of it's been 21 addressed by Your Honor's order this morning with respect to Commander Mascher, but Mr. Gilkerson's report relies on these 22 23 sample shoes. He has already been sent these sample shoes and apparently examined them. 24

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And these photographs that were recently

disclosed -- late disclosed, purport to have some kind of comparison between photographs of shoeprints and apparently some kind of imposition of a sample shoe sole that appeared to be maybe from these photos that we got that may be these sample shoes, although we don't know because we don't have disclosure about them, and we don't have them.

So it would be more than just the sample

So it would be more than just the sample shoes themselves. It would be the reports and examinations and comparisons based on those reports of those shoes. And we raised this issue early on, that we didn't have the sample shoes nor any capacity to get them.

THE COURT: Are you making a representation that you attempted with La Sportiva and were unsuccessful?

MS. CHAPMAN: We did not attempt with La Sportiva because the report that we have indicates that they are no longer in production. The report that we have from La Sportiva is that La Sportiva doesn't create these shoes, and they're not for sale or production.

THE COURT: The soles, as I understand it, were not exclusive to La Sportiva.

 $\qquad \qquad \text{MS. CHAPMAN:} \quad \text{The soles, as I understand it,} \\ \text{were made in China.}$

THE COURT: By a different company than the company that produces La Sportiva?

MS. CHAPMAN: Right.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, they are exclusive to La Sportiva, those soles, but they are made for the La Sportiva company in China. And we got those sample shoes, so to speak, from La Sportiva after they were out of production, also. They still may have a few of them around. That's how we got it, because they had a few of them around.

We have provided the defense with the photographs that Eric Gilkerson relied upon, and we have provided the defense with copies of the photographs of the soles of the shoe, we provided them with disclosure on all of that stuff, Judge.

THE COURT: This still harkens back to the other issues that I think we addressed earlier of where the photographs were taken of the precise prints was something that the photographer couldn't identify. Is that right?

MR. BUTNER: You know, I can't say that for sure, because the photographs that Gilkerson relied upon were the ones that were done in a measure box. And so it may be that there can be testimony about those in terms of exactly where that was accomplished. But I can't -- I'm not in a position to explain that at this point in time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. From a simple discovery process perspective, I think that the fact that the State intends to use the particular samples that they obtained for demonstrative, if not other evidentiary

purposes, I think allows the defense to examine those, to do their own testing with those, and I think the defense has an opportunity to do that if the State intends to submit those as evidence items.

The defense hasn't asked, apparently,

La Sportiva for a pair of sample shoes meeting the

description, but I think defense is entitled to have their

witnesses or experts take photographs, take Xerox copies of

the bottom of the shoes, to ask that those be released to the

defense under stipulations with regard to their return. And

they haven't done that, to my knowledge, or at least not that

has been presented. I am open to being educated with regard

to those issues. But from a simple timing of the disclosure,

as I said the other day, I am not prepared to preclude the

evidence, and I did impose sanctions for the late disclosure

of that that includes striking aggravating factors.

Ms. Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, if I might. To be clear, I am not -- and we are not requesting that you sanction by exclusion all of the shoeprint evidence.

What we are asking you to preclude is the evidence that relates to the examination and comparison of the sample shoe, because we are three weeks away. Even if the State provided us with the shoe today -- and we think we need the shoe, not just photographs of it -- the shoe that

was sent to the FBI was provided -- the shoe itself, to

Commander Mascher. I think there was more than one shoe that

the State received. The photographs show pictures of

multiple shoes, so we would need to actually have the shoe.

But even if we received it today, with three weeks to go, we simply don't have time to do what is necessary to be done. I'll note that apparently Mr. Gilkerson had the shoe for a lot longer than three weeks to perform the examination that he did.

And we are asking, Your Honor, to preclude only those reports and examinations that rely or relate in any way to the sample shoe — to the photographs of the sample shoe and to the actual examination of the comparison of the sample shoe — not to the earlier report. I understand your sanction with respect to that, but this is another late disclosure. We're three weeks away. We don't have time to even make use of it if it was provided. That's what we're asking.

THE COURT: I am not convinced of the latter part of your argument, that you don't have time to be able to have an evaluation if you get the shoes, so I am going to deny the preclusion.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Jail visit recordings. Actually, we are right at about noon, so you have about ten minutes for

me to be able to give my staff a lunch.

MS. CHAPMAN: Okay. Your Honor, with respect to the jail visit recordings, Your Honor had entered an order back in January for the State to identify what statements of Mr. DeMocker's it relied on. For those statements before December 31st, the date was February 6th; for those statements through January, it was February 13.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CHAPMAN: The State disclosed in January summaries of over 1,000 jail calls to the defense. It didn't identify any of them as statements it intended to rely on.

It did produce a police report entitled "Call Summaries," and then other summaries were provided on CD.

The State later indicated that we were supposed to somehow divine that those that were put in a police report as opposed to a CD were those statements that it intended to rely upon. Those summaries the State began to generate in 2008. They didn't disclose any of them to us until January of 2010. So they were all late disclosed. None of them, again, were identified as statements.

And then in the State's reply it indicates, well, we have filed additional supplements, which we also didn't identify as statements, which we also expected you, the defense, to divine were somehow statements we intended to identify on. And both of those disclosures, Your

Honor, one which was made in March and one which was made in April, contain statements from 2009 and January 2010, both of which would be precluded, based on your earlier deadlines requiring disclosure by February 6th and February 13th, respectively.

So we'd ask Your Honor to limit the State to statements that it properly disclosed under Rule 15, which would be the statements that Mr. DeMocker made to authorities, once we get through the voluntariness hearing. But with respect to their requirements under Rule 15, the only properly identified statements are the statements that Mr. DeMocker made to law enforcement, and that's it.

They haven't identified any other statements as though they intend to rely on. They certainly didn't do it in a timely way. All of the summaries disclosed in January were late disclosed because they were generated as early as 2008. None of them were identified properly as statements they intended to rely on. These later reports were both late disclosed.

There are two calls on the April disclosure that relate to February that may not be late disclosed, based on their timing now, because I don't think Your Honor imposed a deadline with respect to February or later calls. We'd ask you to impose a deadline now for any and all calls and any and all statements. These also were

not disclosed or identified as statements that the State intends to rely on.

And the other thing, Your Honor, is that in this disclosure that the State now says was a disclosure of statements, even though it's just called call summaries, the State also revealed that it's disclosing a visitation summary, that it's listening somehow to Mr. DeMocker's visitation rooms from February, and no recording of that visitation has been provided. We have been provided with three visitation recordings all from January, none from February.

Honor, in terms of statements, and it responds like this in this most recent response, is it provides a list of 16, I think, people and it says that it intends to rely on any and all statements that Mr. DeMocker made to a list of these 16 people. It does not provide what those statements are, any date of statements, when those statements were made.

Your Honor, we provided this as an attachment to an earlier filed motion, but I have a copy of it for you. It literally just says "any and all statements defendant made," and then it lists a list of people. That is also not compliant with Rule 15. The State hasn't identified properly any statements other than those Mr. DeMocker made to law enforcement on July 2nd and 3rd and October 23rd.

So we'd ask Your Honor to limit their use of any and all statements to those statements that it's properly identified.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, first of all, the State has made all kinds of disclosure about all of the statements that Mr. DeMocker has made, starting with, of course, the interviews that took place in close proximity to the crime, and then thereafter there were other statements that were discovered that were disclosed to the defense, and they have been noticed in terms of the statements made to all those people that were identified. They are all set forth in the reports.

THE COURT: In terms of identifying them, we are not talking about the ones that were made to law enforcement. They are conceding to that point.

Apparently, we are talking about jail visits or statements that are attributed to Mr. DeMocker from civilian witnesses, not law enforcement personnel.

MR. BUTNER: Well, those are very different sorts of statements.

THE COURT: I understand that.

And so the -- with regard to the jail visits, don't you think that Rule 15.1 requires you to provide the recording of the statement?

MR. BUTNER: Yes.

THE COURT: And don't those have to be timely disclosed?

MR. BUTNER: Well, we didn't realize that we were going to need to provide those things until January, and we gathered that stuff up and provided it, Judge. It had been being accumulated, in terms of people listening to the calls and making synopsises.

When we disclosed it, we were under the order of the Court and of the belief that we needed to disclose the ones that mattered, so to speak, and we identified those with a specific report from Detective McDormett.

THE COURT: How do the statements fit in to having some probative value on the merits of the case? What is the nature of the statements, since I don't have access here?

MR. BUTNER: There is so many, Judge, that I can't tell you right now, but let me clarify to you.

The actual recordings of the jail visits were being disclosed in a timely fashion as we went along.

It was the synopsises and then the requested additional specificity as to are these important ones that was clarified by the report from Detective McDormett.

In terms of the other statements to other

1 people, that was made clear right at the outset in the police 2 reports. For example, statements to Charlotte DeMocker and 3 Jacob Janusek in close proximity to the time; statements that Mr. DeMocker made to other people about where he was and what 5 he was doing, things of that nature; Rene Gerard -- how he 6 took Rene Gerard out to the scene and showed her around --7 showed her where he rode his bike that day. That's a statement made by the defendant that was specified in the 8 9 reports, that were disclosed very early on in this case. 10 THE COURT: And are in constituent recordings 11 from jail conversations? MR. BUTNER: The only ones that are really 12 13 specified in terms of being relevant and probative -- I think that's what you are asking --14 15

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THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BUTNER: -- and material, would be the ones that were specified in Detective McDormett's report that came out, basically, shortly after contemporaneously with the January 29 disclosure, is my recollection.

THE COURT: And have --

MR. BUTNER: And we have done another one since then? Okay. We have done another one since then.

THE COURT: And in general, what do they purport to prove? They aren't admissions of having committed the offense, I take it.

MR. BUTNER: No, they aren't that. But they are basically various statements along the lines of he was experiencing financial pressure or in one instance I think he has made a statement as to riding his bike in the area. kind of thing. THE COURT: And don't we get to the point of cumulative on this stuff? MR. BUTNER: It may well be that we would get to the point of cumulative on that stuff. That is exactly right, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Why, if you concede the point, were some disclosures made after the cutoff date that I imposed? MR. BUTNER: Well, first of all, because we didn't think that they were of any significance until they were reviewed more carefully, and then it was determined that they were relevant to certain issues in the case, and that they have been requested. And so we complied with the Court's order. Now, bear in mind, Judge, we had been disclosing the actual recordings all along. THE COURT: That was part of my question that I think you answered earlier. MR. BUTNER: Okay.

THE COURT:

Ms. Chapman.

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MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, this arose originally back in November or December, because we had received over, I think, 2700 jail calls at that time. We continued to receive them, and it is a very large quantity. And that is why at the time Your Honor ordered the State to identify by call time and number and recording number which statements it was going the rely on, so that it could be narrowed down. Because the State originally said "We're going to rely on all 2700 of these calls." And apparently, what I understand the State --

THE COURT: And are you saying that they didn't do that at all?

MS. CHAPMAN: I'm saying they did that with respect to a certain number of calls. They didn't identify them in any way. They didn't say these are the statements we intent to rely on, as Your Honor had ordered.

They provided them in a police report, and they provided them in a thousand summaries and said you should be able to figure out that this is what we meant.

Well, now we understand what they meant, but that is not what happened. They didn't do it in compliance with Your Honor's order.

They later have now disclosed additional reports that they said they intend to rely on that are past the deadline. So frankly, I don't know exactly what they

intend to rely on from these call summaries. And in addition to that, this disclosure that just lists any and all statements defendant made to 16 people doesn't comply with that order either.

We need to know what statements the State intends to use from what dates so that we are prepared and so we can address whether they are cumulative or whether they are relevant. That is what Your Honor's order contemplated. That's what the rule contemplates. That's what will permit us to be prepared to try this case in three weeks, and that's not where we are, based on the State's disclosure.

My understanding of these supplemental reports in March and April -- we continue to get recordings, but these reports are apparently -- although they weren't identified that way when they were disclosed, they've now been identified as statements that the State intends to rely on. They do have statements that were made in November of 2009 and January of 2010. They are being disclosed to us now.

And again, Your Honor, all of these summaries were withheld from us from late -- from January of 2010. We did have the 2700 recordings with no transcripts or summaries that the State was receiving.

So we believe we should have been -- and under your order and under the rule -- provided with notice

of the statements before today. We weren't provided with that notice before today. We don't presently have the notice. We don't think they've complied with the rule, and we think what they've properly identified are the statements that Mr. DeMocker made to law enforcement on July 2nd and 3rd and October 23rd, and other than that, they haven't complied.

THE COURT: Well, I am going to wrap by the order that I entered previously. And other than recordings that may have taken place after the date -- and I didn't set any time limits with regard to those made subsequent to that, I was concerned about what had already taken place.

I think that the State has not complied with Rule 15.1 in specifically identifying which statements were to be made, and that is what the Court's order was contemplating, so that there could be some true knowledge about what the State regards as probative, relevant statements from particular dates and time frames. To the extent that they've provided summaries that identify by date or a portion of the CD with some specificity, I am going to let them use the statements potentially as far as exclusion is concerned. I still see some other issues with regard to relevance, cumulative, and those sorts of things.

So the recordings, in terms of failure to comply with the Court's order, I am going to sanction as I said I would sanction and preclude those from being used.

But in terms of the identification of phone calls, where the phone calls were provided and some information was provided before the Court's deadlines with regard to which statements were made, I will let the State potentially use those as against a sanction being imposed for that.

Mr. Butner, I am not clear, and I guess even though they know the case much better than I do in terms of the actual statements, it seems to me that the defense is not clear about -- still -- about what statements on what relevant points Mr. DeMocker may have made in jail, phone calls, and the offer of proof isn't -- to the extent that you discussed that as part of your response, isn't very clarifying to me.

So, if there -- with regard to those statements that you believe you timely disclosed, I think there still needs to be an identification of the statement made, of the timing of it, of what you are going to use in a redacted form. You know, we are less than a month from trial commencing. I recognize that we may not be a month from when the stuff may be used. That may be further on down the road. I think the defense needs that and needs that also by Tuesday of next week. So ordered.

Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, the only thing I would add or ask is that with respect to this list of the

statements to and from this list of names, can we also get 1 2 some kind of clarification about those statements and the 3 date with respect to those -- if they don't relate to jail 4 calls, if they do? I just have no way to know, based on -- I 5 can provide this to Your Honor, but I have no way to know 6 based on this, and I wouldn't want it to be a preservation of 7 any other statement. 8 MR. BUTNER: Those statements are not jail 9 phone call statements, Judge, and it was clear in the 10 disclosure that that is the case. Should I draw their 11 attention to the specific supplement in which the statements 12 appear? 13 MS. CHAPMAN: That would be great. MR. BUTNER: I will do that. 14 15 THE COURT: That probably would be helpful. 16 MR. BUTNER: I'll do that. 17 THE COURT: I think you can probably do that 18 fairly easily. Can you get that by Tuesday, also? 19 MR. BUTNER: I can. 20 MS. CHAPMAN: And so, Your Honor, are you 21 going to provide deadlines, then, for the other calls? I 22 mean, if this is going to a problem that continues to trickle 23 in, are we going to --24 THE COURT: I suppose. If there are 25 additional calls and the State intends to use any of that

information, I am going to say that they need to be disclosed 1 2 within three days of when the call is made. Any that precede 3 today's date, I'll order be disclosed by Tuesday. 4 If there are additional recordings going 5 on, though, which I imagine there are, they have to be 6 disclosed within three days of when they occur -- or as soon 7 as soon as the State learns of them, if we are already in 8 trial. 9 Satisfactory? 10 MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 11 MR. BUTNER: Understood. 12 THE COURT: Both sides, it's clear? 13 MR. BUTNER: Understood. 14 THE COURT: We have Miss Smith coming at 1:15. (Whereupon, these proceedings were concluded.) 15 ***000*** 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2.4 25

I, ROXANNE E. TARN, CR, a Certified Reporter in the State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 - 49 constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to the best of my skill and ability.

SIGNED and dated this 15th day of April, 2010.



Certificate No. 50808